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Rationale, aims, and objectives: This paper examines a remarkable dispute between Dutch
insurers, hospitals, doctors, and patients about a set of quality indicators. In 2013, private insurers
planned to drastically reform Dutch emergency care using quality indicators they had formulated
drawing from clinical guidelines, RCTs, and systematic reviews. Insurers' plans caused much
debate in the field of emergency care. As quality indicators have come to play a more central role
in health care governance, the questions what constitutes good evidence for them, how they
ought to be used, and who controls them have become politically and morally charged. This paper
is a case study of how a Dutch public knowledge institution, the National Health Care Institute,
intervened in this dispute and how they addressed these questions.
Method: We conducted ethnographic research into the knowledge work of the National
Health Care Institute. Research entailed document analysis, participant observation, in‐depth
conversations, and formal interviews with 5 key‐informants.
Results: The National Health Care Institute problematized not only the evidence supporting
insurers' indicators, but also—and especially—the scope, purpose, and use of the indicators. Our
analysis shows the institute's struggle to reconcile the technical rationality of quality indicators
with their social and political implications in practice. The institute deconstructed quality indica-
tors as national standards and, instead, promoted the use of indicators in dialogue with stake-
holders and their local and contextual knowledge.
Conclusions: Even if quality indicators are based on scientific evidence, they are not axiom-
atically good or useful. Both proponents and critics of Evidence‐based Medicine always feared
uncritical use of evidence by third parties. For non‐medical parties who have no access to primary
care processes, the type of standardized knowledge professed by Evidence‐based Medicine pro-
vides the easiest way to gain insights into “what works” in clinical practice. This case study
reminds us that using standardized knowledge for the management of health care quality requires
the involvement of stakeholders for the development and implementation of indicators, and for
the interpretation of their results.
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2 MOES ET AL.1 | INTRODUCTION
In response to growing demands to achieve cost control, safety, and
transparency, quality indicators (or “performance measures”) have
become increasingly important in the governance of health care. Quality
indicators provide ameans for care providers, decisionmakers, and pur-
chasers to measure, compare, and improve the quality of care.1-3
Experts agree, both in Dutch context,4,5 and internationally,6-8 that indi-
cators are ideally based on a clinical guideline, or—in absence of a guide-
line—on the best available scientific evidence with regard to quality of
care. Although quality indicators are not directly linked to the clinical lit-
eracymovement that Evidence‐basedMedicine (EBM) originally set out
to be,9,10 some have called indicators a “branch” of EBM11 as they fol-
low the same logic: clinical science can determine “what works” and
parameters based on these scientific findings can form an objective
standard for provider behavior.12,13 Quality indicators developed
according to an “evidence‐based approach”6,7 are generally reputed as
a technical measuring device to evaluate the quality of care providers.
As quality indicators have come to play a more central role in
health care governance, the questions what constitutes good evidence
for these parameters, how indicators ought (and ought not) to be used,
and who controls them have become politically and morally charged. In
the Netherlands, these questions were brought to a head when, in
2013, private insurers planned to drastically reform the sector using
a set of quality indicators. The Association of Dutch Health Insurers
had formulated these indicators drawing from clinical guidelines, RCTs,
and systematic reviews from the field of emergency care. Insurers used
the indicators to negotiate which hospitals would preferably provide
emergency services for multi‐trauma, acute myocardial infarction,
cerebrovascular accident, (ruptured) abdominal aortic aneurysm, natal
care, or hip fracture. The indicators substantiated insurers' argument
that the centralization of complex emergency care in few specialized
hospitals would lead to better and cheaper care.
Dutch doctors and professional organizations working in the field
of emergency care strongly contested the accuracy and appropriateness
of the indicators and insurers' use of them. “That [plan] is unacceptable
and must disappear from the agenda... not because we have anything
against health insurers, but because there is not a shred of evidence that
this plan provides patients with better quality or accessibility,” a spokes-
person for hospitals in the Northern region claimed.14 Others called
insurers' plans “absolutely pretentious.”15 Hospitals and medical spe-
cialists were concerned about insurers' lack of medical‐technical and
practical insights into emergency care and feared for the quality of
(and access to) emergency services.16,17
To solve the debate between insurers, hospitals, doctors, and
patients about the indicators, a public knowledge institution, the
National Health Care Institute (Zorginstituut Nederland), intervened.
This public knowledge institution is, amongst other things, responsible
for the organization of understandable, comparable, and unambiguous
information about the quality of care. A special committee of medical
specialists was installed at the institute to assess the quality indicators.
In this paper, drawing from ongoing ethnographic research into
the work of the National Health Care Institute, we analyse the
committee's assessment of said indicators and how they addressed
the questions of what constitutes good evidence for quality indicators,how indicators ought to be used, and who controls them. We concep-
tualize the work of the committee not as a technical exercise, but as
socio‐political work. In the next section we, first, explain our theoreti-
cal background and methodology. Then, we introduce the debate
about the quality indicators in more detail and explain the role of the
National Health Care Institute in the Dutch health care system. After
that, we analyse how the committee assessed the quality indicators
and problematized insurers' strategy to use quality indicators to cen-
tralize emergency care in the Netherlands.2 | THEORY AND METHOD
Drawing on insights from the field of Science and Technology Studies
(STS), we conceptualize the controversy about quality indicators as a
socio‐political event. STS is an interdisciplinary field that examines
the transformative power of science and technology to (re)arrange
contemporary societies.18 Evidence is often invoked as a demarcation
between objective knowledge and normative assumptions. Yet, quality
indicators are developed at the very junction between fact and value.
Therefore, in STS, standards like quality indicators are taken as socio‐
political tools and not as merely technical measuring devices.19 Indica-
tors are socio‐political entities, because they have financial, social,
political, and moral consequences and “restructure the environments
of which they become a part.”20 For example, when health care man-
agers use mortality rates of myocardial infarction as an indicator to
measure the quality of hospitals, this can have far‐reaching conse-
quences for those working in those medical centers: it can redirect
patient flows, reshuffle the social hierarchy between doctors, change
funding opportunities and a hospital's legitimacy to work within the
field of cardiology. As quality indicators “define worth” and structure
the world accordingly, they inevitably become “a site of tensions, risk
and uncertainty.”21 Taking this perspective, we study the assessment
of quality indicators not as a technical exercise, but as socio‐political
knowledge work and a process of negotiating societal values.
While knowledge institutions are generally tasked to give technical
advice, their work in the science‐policy nexus inherently entails the
balancing of scientific and public values.22 This paper is based on ongo-
ing ethnographic research into these socio‐political knowledge work of
the National Health Care Institute, a public knowledge institution in the
Netherlands.23 From October 2013 to September 2017, management
of the institute provided the first author with an in‐house desk (for 1‐
3 days aweek), a digital workplace and access to archives to do intensive
fieldwork within the institute. The first author attended public and
closed meetings of internal working groups (weekly), the executive
board (2‐weekly), as well as expert meetings of the institute's advising
committees (Package Advisory Committee, Quality Council, Scientific
Advisory Committee, Health Care Professions Committee), staff fora,
and informal lunches. As the controversy about quality indicators for
emergency care was a flagship case for the National Health Care Insti-
tute, we decided to focus part of the study on this case.
In 3 consecutive stages, the first author collected empirical data
between October 2013 and August 2016 on the debate about
insurers' quality indicators and the institute's engagement with it
through in‐depth conversations, document analysis, participant
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case, the fist author had informal conversations with involved staff
members and directors at the institute. She delved into the institute's
archives to retrieve all relevant written material referring to the case,
including internal and external emails, minutes of meetings, official,
and internal documents. The author also searched for public reports
and articles in newspapers and professional journals that reported
about insurers' indicators for emergency care and the institute's work
in this regard. This resulted in a dossier of over 450 pages. Secondly,
to gain more direct experience with the institute's involvement in the
debate, the first author attended an executive board meeting on the
issue, plus 4 meetings of the Quality Council in which insurers' indica-
tors were discussed. She also attended 2 days of consensus meetings
that the institute organized with field parties to discuss quality stan-
dards for emergency care. Thirdly, in order to triangulate our observa-
tions and documentary research, we did formal, semi‐structured
interviews. Through “purposive” sampling24 of information‐rich infor-
mants, we selected 5 key persons: 2 members of the Quality Council,
2 staff members, and the council's scientific secretary.
The first, second, and fourth author engaged in an iterative pro-
cess of joint close reading of field notes, reports, policy documents,
minutes, and interview transcripts. (The third author engaged in discus-
sions of the final drafts.) The leading questions in the analysis were
how the institute engaged with the debate about quality indicators,
what the committee of medical specialists decided about the accuracy
and appropriateness of these indicators for the (re)organization of
Dutch emergency services, and why they did so. We aimed to under-
stand how, in the Netherlands, a public knowledge institution
addressed the simultaneously technical and socio‐political questions
of what constitutes good evidence for quality indicators, how indica-
tors ought to be used, and who controls them. Ultimately, as a “mem-
ber‐check,” we sent a written version of the analysis to involve staff
members and interviewees to test our analysis with them (face‐to‐
face/email/ telephone).3 | RESULTS
3.1 | The ER controversy in the Netherlands
Private insurance companies play a prominent role in the Dutch health
care system of managed competition, since the introduction of the
2006 Health Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet). A system of univer-
sal mandatory health insurance obliges all citizens to take out basic
health insurance provided by private insurers. Competition was intro-
duced on 2 levels. Citizens have to choose between competing health
insurance companies during a yearly open enrollment period, and
insurers are expected to negotiate price, service, and quality of care
with providers on behalf of their insured clients.25 Despite heavy reg-
ulation, insurers and hospitals are free to negotiate prices and selec-
tively contract a range of hospital care products. “Selective
contracting” is a vital aspect of the Health Insurance Act. Insurers
can steer their customers away from hospitals that do not reduce their
prices or improve quality. This way, selective contracting is thought to
stimulate both quality and efficiency.26It was in their role as selective contractors that in 2013, the Asso-
ciation of Dutch Health Insurers (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland, hereaf-
ter “ZN”) published its “Quality Vision for Emergency Care,”27 deriving
and formulating quality indicators from the scientific literature, to reor-
ganize emergency services along efficiency lines. According to ZN, the
centralization of complex emergency care in few specialized hospitals
would lead to better and cheaper care. In its report, ZN focused on
urgent neurological, cardiologic and vascular surgical care,
traumatology, and obstetrics. (Emergency paediatrics and emergency
psychiatry were not addressed in ZN's plans, because paediatric care
in the Netherlands is already centralized, and psychiatric care has its
own specific organizational structure.27) The report contained 6 spe-
cific sets of quality indicators: for measuring the quality of care for
multi‐trauma and hip fracture (traumatology), acute myocardial infarc-
tion (emergency cardiology), cerebrovascular accident (emergency
neurology), (ruptured) abdominal aortic aneurysm (vascular surgical
care), and natal care (obstetrics). For example, for multi‐trauma, the
insurers specified that good care required the following: a trauma cen-
ter with a treatment team, 24‐hour accessibility of an internal trauma
team; the presence in hospital of the required specialists within
15 minutes; mobile medical team; adequate facilities (like a CT‐scan
in the emergency room; an operating theatre and intensive care unit
next to emergency room). Quality of care would be measured based
on 30‐day mortality after (multi‐)trauma. In order to guarantee quality,
a hospital was required to treat 240 to 480 multi‐trauma patients per
center, per year.27
ZN substantiated the indicators by referring to Dutch, European,
and international guidelines and a vast number of scientific publica-
tions, including RCTs, systematic reviews, and cohort studies. Accord-
ing to ZN, private insurers could use these indicators for selective
contracting of emergency cardiology, emergency neurology,
traumatology, urgent vascular surgical care, and obstetrics. They also
proposed to centralize these services in specialized centers if the pro-
posed quality indicators indicated that this was desirable.27 By the end
of 2013, insurers started negotiating (using said indicators), which hos-
pitals would maintain a fully equipped emergency unit, and which hos-
pitals would lose part of their emergency care.A journalist reported: “In Rotterdam most complex
emergency care will move to Erasmus Medical Center.
Soon four times as many people will be going there with
a stroke. Five hospitals will lose stroke care.”28
A hospital director stated: “Emergency room closed, no
more obstetrics, nor stroke care, no balloon angioplasty,
and even broken hip operations will have to be done
elsewhere”.15The plans caused much debate in the field of emergency care.
From the exchange of arguments in professional media, it became clear
that the accuracy and use of ZN's indicators was contested by Dutch
professional organizations. The Dutch Hospital Association (NVZ)
emphasized that such indicators need to be well‐founded and was con-
cerned about insurers' lack of medical‐technical and practical insights
into emergency care.16,17 NVZ criticized that insurers gave little cre-
dence to the fact that it is often difficult to predict a patient's diagnosis
before he/she enters a hospital. A patient with acute abdominal pain
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teritis to abdominal aortic aneurysm. The director of the NVZ rhetori-
cally stated: “will concentration mean, for instance, in respect of
abdominal aneurysms, that all patients with stomach pain must be sent
immediately to hospitals with an emergency room for complex acute
care?”15 In another line of critique, the Dutch Order of Medical Spe-
cialists (OMS) claimed that a hospital that loses its contract for the
treatment of, for example, myocardial infarction would have to deal
with a “cascading effect,” meaning that the general cardiology in that
hospital could deteriorate or vanish completely from that hospital,
too. The OMS urged that “a hospital is a careful construction of build-
ing bricks, removing just one brick can cause everything to collapse.”29
Of course, apart from quality concerns, hospitals and specialists had
their own interests at stake in the debate.
In 2014, Dutch professional organizations, the NVZ and OMS,
appealed to theAuthority for Consumers andMarkets (ACM) to express
their concerns about insurers' plans. ACM is the regulatory institute that
oversees markets, fair competition and consumer rights. The regulatory
bodywas concerned that insurers' plans to concentrate emergency care
could “reduce the choices open to patients and insured clients” and
warned insurers that “implementing the proposed plans could contra-
vene the Competition Law.”30 ACM decided that curtailment of con-
sumer choice was only acceptable if it would lead to a considerable
quality gain for patients. The regulatory body ordered insurers to dem-
onstrate that this was indeed the case by providing “independent and
well‐founded quality standards for emergency care”30 or to organize
broad support for the indicators in the field. As ZN required quality indi-
cators for their practice of selective contracting, it turned to the
National Health Care Institute to organize broadly supported quality
indicators.3.2 | The role of the National Health Care Institute
The National Health Care Institute is, amongst other things (such as the
management of the Dutch basic benefits package),23 lawfully tasked to
organize understandable, comparable, and trustworthy information
about the quality of care. Since the introduction of the 2006 Health
Insurance Act, reliable quality information has become a crucial ingredi-
ent for the proper functioning of the Dutch system of managed compe-
tition.31 Quality information provides both consumers and insurerswith
comparable information about the performance of health care providers
in order to negotiate price and quality.32 In the years that followed the
introduction of the Health Insurance Act, the health care sector devel-
oped all kinds of quality information. Themultiplicity of indicators, how-
ever, actually blocked oversight and hindered informed consumer
choice.33 In response to this problem, the Minister of Health proposed
to centralize the organization of quality information, and on April 1st
2014, the National Health Care Institute was established. The institute
was lawfully tasked to organize understandable, comparable, and trust-
worthy information about the quality of care, and has what is called
“overriding authority”: it can authoritatively lay down indicators when
field parties fail to deliver them or to reach consensus. If the institute
uses this “overriding authority,” the development of quality standards
or indicators is put in the hands of theQuality Council, an advisory com-
mittee of the National Health Care Institute.It was from their role as coordinator of quality information that the
institute, was asked to assess the quality indicators for emergency
care. After several rounds of meetings and consultations facilitated
by the institute, the professional organizations of insurers (ZN),
patients (NPCF), medical specialists (OMS), hospitals (NVZ), and aca-
demic hospitals (NFU) failed to reach agreement on insurers' quality
indicators for emergency care. That is to say, the specialists, (academic)
hospitals and patient organizations submitted their own revised set of
indicators, but without the support of the insurers. As a result, the
institute used its “overriding authority” and asked the Quality Council
to review the revised indicator set. The council, in turn, installed a
group of 13 medical specialists to do the formal assessment. To safe-
guard representativeness, the council selected specialists from differ-
ent relevant medical fields in emergency care and from both
peripheral and academic hospitals. Also, the selected specialists could
not be formally affiliated to any of the stakeholders that proposed
the indicators. Next, we show how the committee assessed the quality
indicators and problematized insurer's strategy to use them to central-
ize emergency services in the Netherlands.3.3 | Problem 1: Scope of indicators
The committee installed by the Quality Council was tasked to assess
whether the indicators were “evidence‐based” and adequate for mea-
suring the quality of emergency care. From our interviews, observa-
tions, and documentary research, it became clear that the committee
actually found that most of the indicators were, as staff commented,
“not unreasonable,” as there was sufficient evidence supporting the
indicators. The accuracy of the individual indicatorswas not the primary
problem according to the committee. They did have a problem with the
scope of the indicators. Next, we illustrate this with an example.
Insurers proposed to measure, for example, the quality of care for
acute myocardial infarction (AMI) by looking at how a hospital scored
at the following:
a. availability of a Cardiovascular Intervention Center, Emergency Car-
diovascular Care (ECC), Cardiac Care Unit (CCU), and a cardiac reha-
bilitation ward (structural indicators);
b. percentage of ST‐Elevation Myocardial Infarction (STEMI) treated
with primary percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI), and hospital's
percentage of medication after hospital discharge for AMI (process
indicators);
c. AMI mortality rate after 30 days, patient‐reported functional health
after AMI, and percentage of PCI re‐interventions (outcome
indicators);
d. hospital's/ cardiologist's annual number of PCI‐treatments performed
(600 PCIs per hospital /150 PCIs per cardiologist) (volume norms).27
Our interviewees explained that, while these indicators make sense
in themselves, the quality of the treatment of myocardial infarction
depends on the entire trajectory from incident to aftercare, not just on
what happens inside a hospital. Staff members said that insurers' indica-
tors “started in the hospital,”while “an emergency pathway starts with a
demand for emergency care, so it starts at home perhaps, or in the
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view that the quality of treatment for myocardial infarction,“starts with a patient raising the alarm in good time, after
which the GP takes a look, who then refers the patient to
hospital in good time, and all of that finally determines
the outcome of a myocardial infarction. If you judge a
hospital based on, for instance, survival rates for
myocardial infarction, well then you would also have to
take into account the part of the chain before the
hospital… if people call in the GP too late, or the GP
doesn't do his job properly, you will be running the risk
that indicators will work against hospitals. Well, you
have to realize this, if you are going to make use of this
sort of indicator.”The committee therefore broadened the scope of the indicators.
In their final report “Excellency Demanded for Emergency Care,”34 the
committee systematically supplemented indicators focusing on hospi-
tal performance with indicators regarding the organizational chain of
emergency services (including, for example, regional ambulance ser-
vices, triage systems, and urgent transferal). For AMI, for example,
the committee included “written agreements about cooperation with
partners in the organizational chain” of care for AMI.34 By doing so,
the committee emphasized the importance of the network in which
an emergency patient makes a journey. It is within this network that
diagnoses are made and the quality of treatments takes shape. By
adding “chain agreements” to the set of quality indicators, the commit-
tee required that the quality of hospitals was not only measured by
hospitals' “in‐door” performance, but also measured by looking at
hospitals' abilities to organize and maintain a well‐functioning network
in the region.3.4 | Problem 2: Purpose of indicators
As we stated before, the committee found that most quality indicators
were supported by evidence. This was, however, not the case for the
so‐called “optimum” volume norms proposed by insurers. The commit-
tee problematized not only the lack of evidence for insurers' volume
norms, but also the purpose behind the norms. Next, we elaborate
on the committee's problems with insurers' “optimum” volume norms,
and why they proposed “minimum” volume norms instead.
The idea behind volume norms is that hospitals treating a bigger
volume of patients get better treatment results, thus, leading to better
quality and efficiency. ZN wrote in their report that“large volumes will make it possible to use an expensive
infrastructure […] more effectively. At the same time, a
larger volume will also deploy personnel (specialists and
specialist nurses) that is scarce (and becoming even
scarcer) more effectively.”27ZN proposed “optimum” volume norms describing at what number
of patients the quality and efficiency of emergency services would be
optimized. ZN recommended for stroke, for example, that a hospitals
would have to treat at least 350 patients with cerebrovascular accident
(CVA) per year.27 For (ruptured) abdominal aortic aneurysm (rAAA),insurers claimed that hospitals would have to treat at least 15 ruptured
abdominal aortic aneurysms and a total of 33 abdominal aortic aneu-
rysms or more to deliver good quality care for these
patients.27According to ZN, their “optimum” volume norms were “an
estimate of what is a sensible level of emergency care concentration
in order to book both quality and efficiency gains.”27
Insurers' volume norms, however, were strongly contested by field
parties. According to staff members the “biggest stumbling blocks
really were the volume criteria” in the debate about quality indicators.
The committee's secretary recalled that “the volume norms… that was
what led to discussions,” because these norms had far‐reaching conse-
quences. The chairperson to the committee explained in an interview
that if insurers would have selectively contracted emergency care on
the basis of these optimum volume norms, this “would have resulted
in a lot of casualty departments shutting down … it would have been
a ravage … lots of them would have closed because they were simply
unable to fulfil the criteria.”
The committee installed by the Quality Council was tasked to
assess whether the volume norms were “evidence‐based” and ade-
quate for measuring the quality of emergency care. According to the
committee's secretary there was “insufficient evidence” supporting
these optimum norms. It became clear from our interviews, observa-
tional, and documentary research that the committee did not only have
a problem with the lack of evidence for insurers' volume norms, but
also with the purpose behind these “optimum” norms. A committee
member explained that “based on a principle of solidarity or collectiv-
ity, you might actually think that [care] should be ‘good enough’ every-
where,” and not necessarily “optimal.”
In their final report, the committee proposed “minimum” volume
norms following the advice of the scientific associations of the different
fields ofmedical expertise. Staffmembers explained that scientific asso-
ciations “often stipulate minimum norms” and that “these are often so
low that everyone fulfils them.” The purpose of minimum norms is not
to optimize quality and efficiency, but to secure a minimum level of safe
and reliable emergency services.Working from this idea, the committee
lowered insurers' optimal volume norms to minimum norms. For CVA,
for example, the committee followed the Dutch Association for Neurol-
ogy (NVN) that advised a minimum volume of 100 patients with cere-
brovascular accident (CVA) per year per hospital. At the same time,
the committee raised the minimum volume norm for (ruptured) abdom-
inal aortic aneurysm (RAAA). Working from that same idea that volume
norms serve the purpose of securing safe and reliable emergency ser-
vices, the chairperson explained, the committee thought: “with aneu-
rysm for example… this is a life threatening procedure… and if you do
less than 20 of those in a hospital [per year]…. that is just unwise.” By
stipulating minimum volume norms, the chairperson to the committee
claimed that on the one hand: we “made sure no damage was inflicted
by units having to close down or being no longer able to provide care,
units that I felt – we all felt – were capable of providing good care...”
on the other hand: “our norms prevented aneurysmoperations from still
being carried out in [city X], while they really should be taken to [city Y],
because then the survival of these people is actually much higher.”
Apart from the lack of evidence supporting the optimum volume
norms of ZN, the committee problematized the purpose behind opti-
mum norms. Instead, they stipulated minimum norms, following the
6 MOES ET AL.scientific associations of the respective field of medical expertise.
While the purpose of insurers' optimum volume norms was to organize
optimal quality and efficiency in emergency care and thus optimize
welfare economics, the purpose of the minimum volume norms
endorsed by the committee echoed the rationale of another public
responsibility: a collective duty to secure access and availability of
“good‐enough” emergency services for all.3.5 | Problem 3: Use of indicators
Finally, our research showed that the committee problematized
insurers' unilateral use of the quality indicators. In their final report,
the committee revised and laid down quality indicators for emergency
care and stressed the importance of collectively weighing the applica-
bility of the indicators and their fit with regional context.34
ZN designed quality indicators to enable “insurers to shape their
selective care purchasing.”27 On the basis of these indicators, insurers
had started to compare hospitals in the different regions and started
negotiating selective contracts. Field parties, however, considered
insurers' initiative a top‐down exercise. A hospital director recalled
the negotiations with insurers: “there were lists with green and red
ticks” and objected: “you can't throw down some sort of blueprint from
your ivory tower.”14
According to the chairperson to the committee, the problem was
that insurers were acting unilaterally using standardized knowledge,
while they were actually at a distance from the primary care process
and had no hands‐on experience of emergency care:“This was just one party… and a party that was at a
considerable distance... and because [the insurers] are at
such distance, their only weapon is population data
from the evidence‐based medicine world... which is
standardized… if someone has no hands‐on experience
and has never actually been to an emergency room…
then these are the only available data for him to use.
But, then he forgets the knowledge sources that are
somewhat harder to exploit for him, but that are very
important too…’.With “evidence‐based medicine as the foundation of the quality
movement,” the chairperson claimed, focus has moved to “standard-
ized protocol quality.” But in applying such standards “local data are
important” and collaboration in the region is necessary to exploit
sources of local, tacit, and contextual knowledge. In their final report,
the committee stressed that the quality indicators they proposed were
to be used by professionals to discuss collectively how best to organize
emergency services in the particular regions.34 Rather than a unilateral
tool for selective contracting, the committee proposed the indicators
as a tool for dialogue and learning, allowing regional parties to gain
insight into opportunities to improve situational quality.4 | DISCUSSION
The National Health Care Institute is a public knowledge institute that
is, amongst other things, lawfully tasked to organize trustworthyinformation about the quality of care. We studied how this body inter-
vened in a debate about the quality of emergency care, and in that
context we analysed their assessment of quality indicators as socio‐
political knowledge work. Our analysis of their work showed a struggle
to reconcile the technical rationality of quality indicators with their
social and political implications in practice. The committee installed
by the National Health Care Institute problematized not only the evi-
dence behind some of the quality indicators, but also and especially
their scope, purpose and use. According to the chairperson, the commit-
tee “put the evidence into a bit of perspective.”
In scientific literature on the development of quality indicators it
has been recognized (albeit in different wording) that indicators oper-
ate at the very junction between fact and value.3,6,7,35 Although this
paper describes a single case, it serves as a real‐life example of what
experts on indicator development have long recognized: that even if
quality indicators are based on solid scientific evidence, they are not
“axiomatically good”36 or useful. Indicators developed for 1 purpose
(eg, measuring the quality of care for myocardial infarction or stroke)
may be inappropriate for a different application (eg, measuring the
ideal level of concentration of these emergency services).7 Further-
more, indicators can serve a wide array of values; not all of them
equally desirable from the perspective of public health services. The
proper use of quality indicators in a public context requires the
involvement of stakeholders in the development of indicators, the col-
lective formulation of objectives, and the use of local, tacit, and con-
textual knowledge to aid both the implementation of indicators and
the interpretation of their outcome.36
The socio‐political work of the National Health Care Institute
reflects specific characteristics of Dutch health care. The Netherlands
has a system of managed competition in which insurers are expected
to stimulate quality and efficiency in health care through, for example,
selective contracting. Private insurers, however, still lack public trust in
the Netherlands.37 The Dutch healthcare system is highly regulated
and private insurers operate under strong legislation and are critically
watched by all kinds of professional organizations and state institu-
tions. The Dutch have, furthermore, a culture of consensual policy‐
making called “polderen.”38 Not every health care system is as much
disposed to inclusive dialogue. The attempt by insurers to corroborate
concentration plans with quality indicators reminds us that—with the
marketization of healthcare—quality indicators can easily align to
match the logic of the market. This case study shows that it requires
specific knowledge work and dialogue to realign such scientific tools
to make them socially robust and serve a public purpose.4.1 | Concluding remarks
Quality indicators are not directly linked to EBM. They do, however,
follow the same logic: clinical science—ideally statistical population
research—can determine “what works” and parameters based on these
scientific findings can form an objective standard for provider behav-
ior. Both proponents9,10,39 and critics40,41 of EBM have long
problematized the uncritical use of statistical population research and
the evaluation of medical practices based on probabilistic knowl-
edge.12,13 However, for non‐medical parties who have no access to
the primary care processes, this type of knowledge provides the
MOES ET AL. 7easiest way to gain insights into “what works” in clinical practice.
EBM's emphasis on standardized, impersonal research procedures sug-
gests the possibility of separating “expertise from expert and knowl-
edge from knower” and that it is possible to distill “medical truth
outside the clinical encounter.”13 As a result of this uncoupling of
expert and expertise, the use of statistical population research has
given outsiders to health care the scientific authority to act indepen-
dently in a field where—originally—they had none.42 While outside
interference into clinical practice is of all times,43 critics40,41 feared
that EBM's standardization of medical knowledge, would allow
“strangers”—like inspectorates, policymakers, or insurers—to “regulate
the field of healthcare and hold it accountable using evidence‐based
parameters formulated by the professions” themselves.20 This case
study reminds us that the interplay of forces between the uncritical
use of standardized medical knowledge, the growing use of quality
indicators, and the marketization of health care continues to require
our explicit attention.
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